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Introduction 
During the summer of 2008, I was conducting fieldwork in Nampula City, where I was 
investigating the seeming paradox that the adoption of reforms that were supposed to ‘roll-
back’ the state in fact revitalised it and Frelimo − the formerly socialist ruling party. Although 
Frelimo has had an ambivalent history with both the city and the province of Nampula, the 
party’s dominance now seemed to be deeply entrenched, even if many of the city’s 
inhabitants viewed the current situation with misgiving. An event that seemed to symbolise 
this ambivalence was a scandal that had erupted five years before that alleged government 
complicity in a supposed organ-trafficking ring with occult connotations headed by a foreign 
businessman with links to the party. The goal of this paper is to use this scandal and urban 
politics in Nampula City as a microcosm to discuss the practice of politics in post-reform 
Mozambique and some of the social tensions that have arisen from this process. 
 
One day I was speaking with an Indian merchant about his relationship to the party.1 At some 
point in our conversation I asked him what he thought about the organ-trafficking scandal. 
Although the allegations had been disproved and the causes traced to various land and 
political disputes, my merchant friend was not convinced. According to him:  
These things happen here you know, they believe in sorcery. Just a few weeks ago 
they caught a Nigerian trader at the airport trying to transport 18 kilos of organs.2 
The government does not do anything. Every time the charges are dropped for the 
same reason: ‘lack of evidence’. They are being paid off and maybe they are 
involved themselves. 
After numerous similar conversations, I noticed something quite interesting concerning 
opinions about the 2003 organ-trafficking scandal. Among the better-off, especially Indian 
merchants, popular views continue to be divided, with some thinking it was a political set-up, 
but many others feeling it did actually happen, even if they doubted the efficacy of sorcery. 
For the poorer sections of society, especially workers in the informal sector, many had either 
never heard of it, or thought the story was without any factual basis. While it is not surprising 
that different social groups hold conflicting opinions over events, I became curious as to why 
this story was more credible to some than others. Especially because despite the wealth of 
many Indian merchants and the crucial role that workers in the informal economy play in 
daily urban life, both are, to some degree, socially marginal.  
 
At first glance the merchant’s comments tell a story that has become increasingly familiar in 
anthropology concerning the social effects of what is frequently referred to as ‘neo-liberal 
governmentality’. Neo-liberalism came to Mozambique as part of a wider package of reforms 
                                                 
1 The merchant in question was actually born in Mozambique as were many of his compatriots. I am using the 
term Indian here with its local meaning, which refers to people of Indian or Pakistani descent.  
2 I heard the tale of the Nigerian trader who was caught with 18 kilos of organs multiple times, but I did not find 
any official record of it.  
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promoted by the World Bank, the IMF and many of the major donors. The aim went beyond 
the introduction of a ‘free market’ economic system. The overall goal for the promoters of 
reform was to dismantle the single-party socialist state that teetered on the brink of economic 
collapse due to misguided policy decisions and twelve years of devastating civil war, and 
replace it with a liberal, democratic capitalist polity. While the backers of the reforms spoke 
with the current rhetoric of ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘good governance’, the results 
were, of course, far more ambiguous (Pitcher 2006; West 2001). By the end of the socialist 
period the situation was desperate, with massive shortages and rising prices in the city and 
widespread hunger in the countryside; anything that could bring an end to the war and 
improve conditions was welcomed by many. It is true that the reforms did bring an end to the 
war in 1992, an economic growth rate averaging nearly 8 percent a year since 2004, and three, 
relatively peaceful, national democratic elections starting in 1994. However, this was 
accompanied by growing inequality, increased corruption as politicians’ privatised assets and 
firms to themselves or associates, and the dismantling of the limited social safety net that 
existed for urbanites. Mozambicans often describe the current system as ‘savage’ or 
‘gangster’ capitalism, and as one man once mentioned to me: ‘we have created a system that 
is like Chicago during the time of Al Capone’ (Sumich 2008: 123). 
 
Many anthropologists argue that the rise of unfettered free market forces often coincides with 
an increase in occult beliefs (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). Aspects of this can be seen 
across the world, from Latin America and perhaps the foundational text on the subject − The 
Devil and Commodity Fetishism (Tausigg, 1980) − to Africa, Asia and further afield (Sanders 
2008). The connection between forms of neo-liberalism and the occult is expressed in a range 
of ways from the seemingly counterintuitive ‘modernity’ of witchcraft in Cameroon 
(Geschiere 1997) to workers being possessed by Muslim spirits to express resistance to 
capitalist work discipline in Malaysia (Ong 1987). Accordingly, under conditions where the 
production of wealth seem divorced from actual work and people’s labour seems increasingly 
superfluous, the new economy is understood through ideas of invisible plantations tended by 
zombie slaves, pyramid schemes and prosperity cults (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). Thus, 
organ-trafficking rings often have pride of place in a heady mixture of freewheeling 
capitalism and magic. This is due both to the association of human organs with the occult, at 
least in southern Africa; and when the poor have nothing to sell but their body parts, a form of 
exploitation beyond Marx’s imagination has been reached (Scheper-Hughes 2001: 4). In this 
manner, an organ-trafficking scandal and my merchant informant’s dark hints of the 
complicity of the powerful appears simply as another example of the mistrust and 
bewilderment that have accompanied neo-liberalism’s social onslaught.  
 
Tracing the connections between the sorcery and the introduction of neo-liberalism has 
provided compelling arguments, so much so that Sanders (2008) has suggested that showing 
the association between the introduction of neo-liberalism and the outbreak of beliefs in new 
forms of the occult has become an anthropological orthodoxy. Although there certainly can be 
a connection between magical and economic practices, the idea of the occult acting as the 
‘people’s’ critique of neo-liberalism does not seem convincing in this case. Most 
commentators, when referring to neo-liberalism, seem to be referring a set of practices that 
include the fetishisation of the market as the ultimate source of freedom, the demonisation of 
the state and the reliance of mechanisms such as privatisation to unleash the entrepreneurial 
energies of the populace (Kipnis 2007: 385). This view is backed by Harvey, who argues that 
neo-liberalism is primarily a political project, designed to restore the power of economic 
elites (Harvey 2005). However, these views tend to conflate the ideology of neo-liberalism 
from the results of implemented policies. In fact the implementation of supposedly neo-liberal 
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reforms is riddled with contradictions and unintended consequences, not least of which is the 
much commented upon irony that the state was supposed to preside over its own 
dismemberment. Other scholars, such as Rose and Miller (1992) argue that neo-liberalism is a 
form of governmentality, at least in so-called ‘advanced liberal democracies’, whose goal is to 
create autonomous and self-regulating citizens that the state can govern from a distance. In 
the case of Mozambique though, instead of even attempting to govern at a distance, in 
imitation of ‘advanced liberal democracies’, the reforms allowed Frelimo to finally govern 
directly in areas where their control has historically been weak, by increasing the dependence 
of certain social groups on the state (Pitcher 2006). 
 
The second common assumption concerning neo-liberalism is that it creates some sort of 
rupture, where previous social relationships, structures and moral orders are torn asunder by 
the unstoppable juggernaut of global capitalism (Sanders 2008). It is impossible to deny that 
Mozambique has undergone some profound changes since the fall of socialism in 1990. 
However, Mozambican history has been characterised by a brutal form of colonialism, an 
eleven-year liberation struggle and then civil war. Violent transitions are perhaps far more the 
norm than the exception and the difference between ‘neo-liberalism’ and the historical 
practice of capitalism in former colonial settings in not entirely clear. There is always the 
danger that critiques of neo-liberalism fall prey to the seductive rhetoric of what they are 
attacking. Whether seen as a force of progress or destruction, there is the tendency to view 
neo-liberalism (perhaps following the logic of advertising) as something totally new and 
unprecedented, while missing its equally important historicity and continuity in practice 
(Cooper 2005; Kipnis 2008). 
 
I argue that instead of destroying the previous social order and causing a complete rupture, it 
appears that in the Mozambican case the adoption of a wide range of reforms intended by 
foreign backers to restrict the role of the state actually revitalised it. The major result of 
political and economic reforms was to create a space on the lower levels of the social 
hierarchy, where actors − many of whom already occupied at least a relatively privileged 
position − could then jockey for power. While it has become almost an anthropological 
orthodoxy to see events, such as the Nampula organ-trafficking scandal, as a critique of 
emerging inequalities by the oppressed expressed through an occult narrative, this incidence 
points to a different conclusion. Instead it appears that the scandal was designed to speak to 
the poor as part of a political campaign of ‘dirty tricks’ in the run up to an election. However, 
as a tactic it backfired. I argue that this is because the scandal was designed by those who are 
comparatively privileged, but with an ambivalent relationship to Frelimo’s structures of 
power; and it spoke more convincingly to their fears of the party’s growing dominance than to 
those of the wider population.  
 
Nampula City 
To understand how the organ-trafficking scandal sheds light on the practice of power in 
Mozambique, we must first briefly discuss the city where it erupted. Nampula is 
Mozambique’s third largest city, with an estimated population of 477,900 (Instituto Nacional 
de Estatística 2007).3 The city is situated inland in a rich agricultural region and is the 
provincial capital. In addition to the city’s political functions, it is an important trade hub for 
both internal consumption and international products that enter Mozambique through the 
                                                 
3 Instituto Nacional de Estatística, available at http://www.ine.gov.mz/ 
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nearby port of Nacala and then are shipped to central Africa. The city is home to a thriving 
Indian merchant community and is often referred to as the ‘Indian capital’ of Mozambique.   
 
Frelimo has an ambivalent history in the province of Nampula. Although it was a theatre in 
the eleven-year liberation struggle against the Portuguese, the party’s hold was tenuous in 
large areas of the province. The effects of Frelimo’s post-independence socialist 
modernisation programme were contradictory and often unwittingly exacerbated local 
conflicts in many rural areas of the province (Geffrey 1991; Hall and Young 1997; Pitcher 
2006). Due to the party’s mistakes, the Renamo rebels were able to take advantage and 
entrench themselves in parts of the province, leading to fierce fighting during the civil war 
(Geffrey 1991).4 Nampula City’s population surged as peasants fled the war-torn rural areas 
for the comparative safety of the town. However, Renamo developed a social base throughout 
the province, especially amongst the poorest and most marginalised.  
 
Sixteen years after the end of the war Nampula City’s economy is booming, but the benefits 
seem to be monopolised by a select few. Many of the plantations and factories (especially 
cashew-nut production, one of the largest cash crops) that managed to survive the war and 
economic crisis of the socialist period were finally shut during the post-war structural 
adjustment programme, creating even more unemployment (Hanlon 1996). A frequent 
complaint heard from the well-off and the poor alike is that despite the construction of a 
cement plant, a Coca-Cola bottling factory and the O’Connor’s industrial chicken farm, much 
of the economy is based on trade and commerce, which can create great wealth, but relatively 
few jobs for the poor and little stability for the better-off. The fall of socialism has not ended 
the antagonism of powerful local actors, such as the provincial hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church, which was singled out during the revolutionary period as being the church of the 
colonial state and thus lost land and influence. Dissatisfaction manifested itself during the 
first two national elections, where Renamo won the majority of provincial votes. The organ-
trafficking scandal broke out in the run-up to the first municipal election that Renamo decided 
to contest. After Frelimo obtained an overall electoral victory in 1999, despite suspicions of 
ballot rigging, it had become clear that the centre of power was to remain inviolate. In spite of 
this, Renamo is able to compete at the local level and Frelimo was worried that it could lose 
control of the second most economically important city in the country. Thus, to understand 
the scandal one also has to be aware of the larger social context. which included political 
tensions and growing resentment as the effects of the much lauded economic boom seemed to 
be largely limited to just a few social groups, including Indian merchants (or monhes as they 
are derogatorily known), Frelimo party bosses, well-connected people from Maputo (the 
national capital) and foreign investors.  
 
Politics, Nuns and Organ Traffickers 
I first met Gary and Tania O’Connor in 2008, when I had been told by members of the 
municipality that the O’Connor’s and Farm Fresh Chicken were the perfect example of what 
could be achieved when the government and foreign investors work together. It was hard to 
believe that just five years ago the O’Connors were at the centre of a scandal that received 
international attention. In addition to numerous Mozambican articles written about the 
subject, lurid headlines such as ‘Organ Trafficking is Undeniable’ (Associated Free Press, 
March 3, 2004) or ‘Organ Traffickers Threaten Nuns’ (BBC, February 13, 2004) appeared on 
major news services.  
                                                 
4 Since the peace agreement in 1992 Renamo has become the nation’s major opposition party.  
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Gary O’Connor is from Zimbabwe, and had previously worked in South African and Malawi, 
where he met his wife Tania, then working for an NGO. When they heard of the boom 
conditions in Mozambique they decided to relocate. They initially set up a business selling 
seafood from the coastal city of Angoche to Zimbabwe, but as the Zimbabwean economy 
began to collapse their market disappeared and they moved to Nampula city to open an 
industrial chicken farm.  
 
In the beginning the move to Nampula worked out well. In one of the richest agricultural 
regions in the country, many of the basic foodstuffs are imported, including chickens, which 
came from Brazil. The Mozambican government was eager to attract foreign investors, and 
the municipality gave them land a few kilometres out of town, neighbouring a Catholic 
mission, for the farm. Financing for the O’Connors comes from a state-owned bank that 
charges close to 30 percent interest, but in Gary’s view this is an advantage as it makes the 
state something akin to a silent partner and offers a degree of political protection. The farm 
currently produces around 96,000 chickens per year and the O’Connors have a contract 
system with various small farmers that produce another 36,000 chickens per year.  
 
The actual running of the O’Connors’ operation, though, is far more difficult. The 
Mozambican system is heavily bureaucratic with strict labour regulations. Strikes and 
pilfering are constant problems with the workers and, according to Gary, it is very difficult to 
actually fire anyone. His overall relationship to the government is generally good. While 
neither he nor Tania are particularly political they prefer Frelimo because: ‘They may be 
dictatorial, but they know how to keep things under control’. Unlike the government, the 
O’Connors’ relationship with their neighbours can be more antagonistic. Renamo is strong in 
the area near the farm and some local leaders lost land when Farm Fresh Chicken was 
established. These leaders have since organised the local peasants to engage in frequent land 
invasions. There have also been acrimonious land and boundary disputes with the 
neighbouring Catholic mission. Long simmering local disagreements and the run-up to 
municipal elections formed the social context when the O’Connors were first accused of 
kidnapping local children and harvesting their organs. One of the common assessments of the 
scandal, which is also Gary’s opinion, is that the local Catholic hierarchy took advantage of 
the accusations to try to damage the O’Connors and Frelimo, and enlisted Renamo as foot 
soldiers to back up their claims.5 
 
The scandal began when a Brazilian Catholic lay missionary, Maria Elilda dos Santos, 
accused the O’Connor’s of running a ring that kidnapped local children and trafficked their 
organs. The scandal quickly spread as the accusers claimed that many members of the 
municipal and provincial government were complicit. Sister dos Santos claimed she had 
information that proved that dozens of local children who had supposedly disappeared had 
been murdered and their organs and body parts removed. She claimed that staff at the local 
airport was allegedly complicit in the transportation of body parts, and the police were 
actively involved and engaged in a campaign of intimidation towards those who spoke out 
against the organ-trafficking ring. The police investigated and found nothing, but the story 
continued to grow, despite or because of police denials. Gary and Tania first realised that the 
accusations were being taken seriously when their movements were monitored by a car full of 
nuns from the neighbouring mission that followed them wherever they went. However, it still 
took them by complete surprise when a detachment of police officers carrying AK-47s arrived 
                                                 
5 Due to political constraints and the way the scandal eventually played out, it was very difficult to get the point 
of view of the Catholic Church and members of Renamo. While I acknowledge the lack, I have tried to speak to 
as many different people as possible and consult a wide variety of sources. 
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at their farm with a warrant to search the premises. The search turned up nothing, and 
disproved Sister dos Santos’s claims of a private airstrip on the farm where the O’Connors 
would load crates of arms severed from local kidnapped children. However, Gary had a good 
relationship with the provincial police commander. Their friendship was taken as evidence of 
further police complicity. Various international media outlets, Amnesty International and the 
Spanish Embassy all carried out investigations. Even the national prosecutor-general in 
Maputo sent a team to investigate, but they also turned up no evidence. Despite this, the 
scandal did not abate, perhaps, in part due to a power struggle within the ranks of Frelimo. 
Mozambique’s president of 18 years, Joaquim Chissano, was standing down in favour of a 
long-time party veteran, Armando Guebuza − a former internal and transport minister. With 
both national and municipal elections approaching there was the prospect of a shake-up in the 
hierarchy. According to Gary, the provincial prosecutor-general decided to make his name 
with this case. He also claims that the prosecutor-general was Sister dos Santos’s lover: 
We were driving through Nampula with our daughter when we were stopped in 
the middle of the street by a man in plain clothes and a gun (who turned out to be 
the provincial prosecutor-general). He opened the door and grabbed my wife. He 
was very nervous and his gun accidentally went off twice. No one was hit, thank 
god. Two security guards saw this and ran over to try and help us and that is when 
he showed his ID and told us we were under arrest. They left my car sitting in the 
middle of the street with the doors open and my daughter still inside as they took 
us to prison despite interventions from Maputo and the Danish embassy (Tania is 
Danish). I was put in a cell with 60 people and my wife in a cell with 15, she was 
lucky, she got to share a thin mattress with the cell leader. We did not have any 
trouble there; if anything everyone was curious. The police commandant came in 
and looked at us and then gave some orders and a guard went to my wife and 
asked ‘What’s going on?’ She did not understand and asked what the guard 
meant. The guard looked a bit confused and asked why they had been given 
orders that we were not to be beaten. We spent a weekend in jail, I guess the 
protests from the Danish ambassador and Maputo finally reached the right person. 
The charges by now had spread all the way down to Beira (a major city, where 
Renamo was very strong in the central province of Sofala). From what I hear 
Chissano had enough. He told the arch-bishop that the church was to stay out of 
politics or things would go back the way they were under socialism and then 
everything died down. 
 
Surprisingly for a story of such magnitude, unless one specifically asked about it, it was rarely 
mentioned in Nampula. If it did come up in conversation, as previously mentioned, opinions 
tended to be divided among the better-off, especially the Indian merchants. Responses from 
those who were poorer, especially workers in the informal sector, tended to be quite different. 
Surely some also believed in this underground trade, and I was not able to carry out a 
comprehensive survey. Gary told me that on a couple of occasions during the scandal, people 
from the bairros had offered to sell him people they claimed were relatives. However, most of 
the people I spoke to during my research had never even heard of this scandal. For those who 
had, they tended to be dismissive. The response of one informal trader was especially 
revealing: ‘Our problem is that we do not go to school, so I guess people believe stupid 
stories like this’. Those who found it the most credible tended to be the people who are 
included in the networks of power, but like Indian merchants, still marginal to a degree. 
Although they enjoy the benefits of the new economy, this is dependent on a precarious 
relationship with those in power. 
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I do not mean to argue that the occult never serves as a criticism of unequal relationships of 
power. West (1997) has shown how sorcery forms a popular discourse for the understanding 
of power and governance in Cabo Delgado. Teixeira (2003) has demonstrated how vampire 
beliefs in the Nampula province also have connections with long-established inequalities 
between villagers and urbanites and party members and the rest. Luise White (1993, 1997, 
2000) has developed a rich body of work chronicling the emergence of vampire stories in 
central and eastern Africa during the late-colonial period. She argues that these stories tend to 
appear in times of political and economic stress, where the former order is being overturned 
and people are trying to negotiate their position in an emerging and still uncertain new 
hierarchy (White 1993). As demonstrated by Murray (2005) for the ‘muti’ murders of 
Lesotho, and Pratten (2007) for the man-leopard murders in Nigeria, these anxieties do not 
necessarily stay confined to the realm of discourse. Furthermore there has been a history of 
lynching and attacks in northern Mozambique when villagers accused the better-off of 
poisoning their wells with cholera (Serra 2003).  
 
However, to claim that there has been an increase in occult beliefs as a critique of the 
oppressed of the current economic order is far less convincing. Due to the growth of forms of 
fundamentalist Islam in Mozambique, many of the Indian merchants who did find the story 
credible claimed not to believe in sorcery. When they alleged that the organ scandal did 
happen they were asserting their cultural superiority over those who do believe in these 
practices and arguing that Frelimo has become so corrupt that they will engage in any sort of 
business as long as a profit can be made. For the informal traders that I spoke with, this 
scandal appeared as just another incidence of various kinds of elites fighting it out between 
themselves. This was not a story made by the people, but made up for them and if its goal was 
to appeal to popular imagination it largely failed. Frelimo won the municipal elections and 
none of the officials implicated were punished, some were actually promoted and no charges 
were ever filed. Maria dos Santos left the country shortly after (she claims this was under 
duress) and one of her chief co-accusers, Sister Doraci, was found murdered, − although this 
appears to have been the result of a dispute over money she had embezzled (BBC, February 
27, 2004). As Gary told me when I asked him if he thought people believed the story: 
Look around, I am about six kilometres out of town and there are no police here. I 
am surrounded by little villages and if they really though I was killing their 
children do you think I would still be alive? I would have been lynched long ago.     
 
To Belong and to be Excluded  
The Nampula organ scandal seems quite different to the standard narrative of occult 
economies as it appears to speak more convincingly to the fears of the rich than the poor. The 
questions this section will examine are: what does this tell us about both the disjunctures and 
historical continuities of neo-liberal reforms in Mozambique; and what does the adoption of 
‘free’ market economics, privatisation and democratisation tell us about people’s positionality 
in the social system.6 The adoption of reforms has allowed Frelimo to co-opt and include 
social groups on whom it had difficulties imposing its will during the socialist period, and 
thus allowed the party to pursue its long-held goal of constructing national unity. 
Nevertheless, even with the period of revitalisation that has strengthened Frelimo’s hold, this 
still only encompasses a comparatively small percentage of Mozambique’s population, even 
                                                 
6 While aspects of economic liberalisation preceded democratisation in Mozambique, the two are commonly 
seen as deeply interconnected due to the overall timing, and the tight association between these projects and 
western donors and international institutions (West 1997).  
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in urban areas. As the organ-trafficking scandal allows us to see, the adoption of reforms has 
opened up some space for elites to jockey for position, and these struggles are viewed with 
fear by some of the better-off as they can have direct effects on their lives. For many others, 
though, the battles of elites are viewed as something far distant and perhaps as a matter of 
indifference to themselves.  
 
However, trying to maintain a social base including important allies means Frelimo has to 
engage in a delicate balancing act. In a recent article Pitcher (2006) argues that a process of 
‘organised forgetting’ is taking place in Mozambique where the government deliberately 
downplays or distorts the socialist period to enable it to court new allies amongst business 
communities and to build a new ‘neo-liberal’ national identity amongst an emerging black 
middle class. This effort is contested by industrial workers who make use of socialist rhetoric, 
rights and obligations to advance their own struggles. Pitcher makes a very valuable 
argument, incisively documenting the change of strategy and rhetoric from a ‘worker and 
peasant’ state to one that encourages entrepreneurial vigour. Furthermore the social contract 
has changed. Where urbanites once could demand that the state take care of their (bare) 
minimum needs for subsistence, it has now become the right of a lucky few to be rich. 
Nevertheless it can be misleading to assume a smooth trajectory of state obligations receding 
in the face of ‘neo-liberal’ opportunities. Frelimo did try to actively recruit and ally itself with 
business communities it previous antagonised, but as the party’s power has grown, these 
mercantile groups increasingly have few other options. On the other hand, the party has 
recently passed pro-worker legislation, which a former minister explained to me is both 
because it is a populist move to win votes and because the party leadership still feels a 
responsibility towards factory workers. Instead of championing one group or the other, in 
practice it appears as if Frelimo equally penalises everyone. I asked an official of the nation-
wide official trade union OTM (Organisation of Mozambican Workers) whether he felt the 
current labour laws favoured workers and capital. He replied by laughing and then saying: 
‘The law does not favour anyone. Its like the laws of nature, it favours the one who survives’. 
To illustrate some of the social complexity of the urban social hierarchy in Nampula, I will 
now give examples from two groups that at first glance appear to be the embodiment of the 
new economy, Indian merchants and informal traders. 
 
Although the vast majority of Indian merchants I met in Nampula are members of Frelimo, or 
at least supporters, the fact they tended to give more credibility to the organ-trafficking 
scandal is not surprising, considering their history with the party. Almost all of them had tales 
of how their family suffered during the socialist period. Homes and businesses were 
nationalised, and family members had to flee the country, or in other cases were arrested for 
what was then known as economic sabotage. Stories of Frelimo’s assumption of power often 
sounded like an invasion of the barbarians. Many continued to stay in Mozambique, though, 
and not all suffered at the hands of the party. Nationalisation was not universally employed; 
only those businesses that the party felt were exploitative, or those abandoned by their owners 
after independence were directly taken over (Pitcher 2002). Small shops were generally left 
alone and Indian merchants gradually began to take over this sector during the socialist 
period, as the previous Portuguese merchants often fled the country after independence. 
Nevertheless it was very difficult to import stock during socialism and as the civil war grew 
in intensity businesses were often at risk of being looted by one side or the other, or 
sometimes both. The fortunes of Indian merchants have improved considerably since the end 
of the war, but merchant complaints against the government are still legion, with ‘corrupt’ 
and ‘half-socialist’ being amongst the most prominent. Those difficulties did not appear to  
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overtly affect party support. As I was told by one merchant: 
Renamo? They do nothing and they do not really have the capacity to do 
anything. They make all sorts of promises, but they could not deliver anything. 
The peasants and the marginalised support Renamo because they have no capacity 
to think about the future. They just want something now regardless of the 
consequences. Renamo would just come in and take something and then try to sell 
it to somebody else. That is how Dhklama [Renamo´s president] got his house in 
Maputo. Someone else had the legal title, but he just took it. We, the businessmen 
and the middle classes, we all vote for Frelimo. We have the capacity to think 
about the future and the peasants do not.  
In addition to fears over property rights and the larger population, especially as the militant 
non-racialism of the socialist period fades, political dependence is also a factor. An Indian 
businessman told me that they had to support Frelimo. One can run a family shop largely 
independently, but if one has greater ambitions it is extremely difficult to do this without the 
support of the party. 
 
Indian merchants have been one of the most visible winners of the new economy in Nampula 
City. Many were able to consolidate the economic base they built in the socialist period and 
have gone on to become major financial players under capitalism. Despite their wealth, 
though, their success to a large degree depends on the goodwill of Frelimo, a party they have 
had an ambiguous history with. Many merchants are engaged in what can be described as a 
structural relationship with the party, as it does not depend on bribing a single official, but 
instead has links to the leadership in Maputo, at least for the larger businessmen. Despite the 
growing alliance, though, the relationship between the party and Indian merchants remains 
fraught and characterised by distrust. Popular feeling against monhes is strong as they are 
perceived by many party members and the wider population as dishonest and exploitative. 
Furthermore, several Indian merchants have first hand experience of the corruption and 
unscrupulousness of certain party officials. Members of Frelimo also view Indian merchants 
with considerable distrust, as the fortunes of some of the leading businessmen were based in 
various illegal activities. The fact that many Indian merchants believed that party members 
would be complicit in organ trafficking makes sense when viewed against this backdrop. 
They are included in the structures of power, but in a relationship based on mutual benefit, 
distrust and fear.  
 
The informal traders I spoke with gave the scandal far less credibility and occupied a very 
different social position. They have become a ubiquitous symbol of capitalism as every urban 
street is now full of people selling various commodities. It is misleading, however, to view 
informal traders as an entirely new phenomenon or as a single unified group. One of 
Frelimo’s major mistakes during the socialist period was to view the population as members 
of single categories, workers or peasants, and not to take into account the large variety of 
strategies people employ to make a living when formulating policies (Hall and Young 1997; 
O’Laughlin 2000; Pitcher 2006). This tendency has survived into the capitalist period. 
Numerous people combine trading on the informal market with farming, or as something to 
earn extra money while they study, as we shall see in the following examples. Helder is a 21-
year old street vendor. He sells mobile phone top-up cards he buys from the state-owned 
national mobile service provider, MCEL, through an Indian-owned shop with links to MCEL 
for a small discount. His average profit is about 50MTN per day.7 Helder was born in a 
village 20 kilometres outside of Nampula and his mother survives by farming the family 
                                                 
7 At the time of writing it is around 29 MTN to $1. 
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machamba (small plot of land). He came to stay with his brother and cousin who were already 
in the city; they live in a palhota (shack) in a peri-urban area on the outskirts of town with his 
cousin’s pregnant girlfriend. Other street vendors engage in the informal sector simply to 
raise funds for school fees, or to get some pocket money. Sergio is 20-years old and also sells 
MCEL cards with Helder. He was born in the city and lives with his parents. His mother is a 
waitress at a coffee shop and his father used to work for the national railway, but is now 
unemployed. Unlike Helder he is still studying and is in the 8th class. 
 
The informal sector contains many different social categories within it, and this does not 
preclude various types of connections to the party held by individual members. Frelimo 
officials, though, tend to view it as a singular entity, that is uncontrolled and possibly a threat. 
This view has historical antecedents, ever since colonialism, when urbanites without fixed 
employment were viewed as possibly subversive. During the socialist period there were 
efforts to mobilise the entire population for the heroic effort of constructing a modern nation. 
However, many urbanites, especially those who would now be termed workers in the informal 
economy, were viewed as lazy idlers and a criminal element by the leadership (Hall and 
Young 1997). This distrust increased as the economy faltered and the parallel, or ‘black 
market’, economy grew. In desperation the party resorted to coercive measures. The most 
infamous being ‘Operation Production’ in 1983, where those who could not prove 
employment and urban residence were rounded up and shipped to rural areas in the far north 
to ‘build cities in the bush’. Between 30,000 to 50,000 were exiled (Cabrita 2000). Since the 
fall of socialism and the onset of structural adjustment the number of people that survive to 
one degree or another on the informal economy has grown. The ruling party still seems to be 
unable to incorporate these people in their structures, and party leaders and municipal 
authorities speak worriedly of ways in which they can restrict urbanisation. Although the 
informal economy is interlinked with the formal in a variety of ways, especially as most 
vendors buy their goods from shops and warehouses, there is a palpable sense of disconnect. 
When asked what they thought the social hierarchy in Nampula is, Helder and Sergio broke it 
into specific ranks. First are the Indians, then the people from Maputo, then the local 
government, followed by Nigerian merchants, and those who live in the cement city. Finally 
comes everybody else, where they included themselves. It is not surprising that the struggles 
for power symbolised by the organ-trafficking scandal seemed irrelevant. For them it 
appeared as something happening very far away.   
  
Conclusion 
This paper has used a scandal that broke out in Nampula City in 2003 and how it relates to 
politics after the implementation of ‘neo-liberal’ reforms. The reform package that was 
largely imposed on Mozambique by powerful international institutions, such as the World 
Bank, the IMF and the nation’s major donors, is part of a wider process of ‘neo-liberal’ 
governmentality that has swept through Africa since the mid-1980s. The goal was to 
dismantle existing political structures that donors and international institutions had come to 
see as ‘pathological’ and create liberal capitalist polities based on ideas of ‘transparency’ and 
‘good governance’ that would bring prosperity to their people and hopefully be able to pay 
back ever increasing debts. Much of the analytical attention has been focused on the sweeping 
changes that, for good or ill, these reforms ushered in. However, I have argued that we should 
pay more attention to the equally important historical continuities (Sanders 2008). 
 
By focusing on one specific scandal in a particular place and social context, I have tried to 
view Nampula City as a microcosm of the practice of politics and power in Mozambique. In 
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this case we do see aspects of social disruption as the state abandons some of its previous 
obligations to its citizens. Equally important, though, are the ways in which the effects of 
reform have revitalised the structures of power. Instead of viewing the discourse of the occult 
as a subtle critique by the excluded and oppressed, more attention should be paid to why 
certain stories appear at particular times. In fact, the organ-trafficking scandal was a story 
crafted by elites for a political effect that was interpreted differently by specific social groups. 
For some of those who are included to varying degrees in the networks of power, aspects of it 
might be plausible, but for mass consumption, especially by social groups that have long 
proved difficult for the state to incorporate, it seems to have largely passed them by. Instead 
of ‘neo-liberal’ governmentality being a project to create autonomous subjects, as Rose and 
Miller (1992) contend for the case of ‘advanced western democracies’, or destroying the state 
in the interests of economic elites as argued by Harvey (2005), something very different is 
going on in Mozambique. Here neo-liberalism among wider reforms has been reclaimed by 
the party as a state project that increased the dependence of certain social groups on Frelimo, 
while allowing the party access to outside resources as a reward for reform. Even Gary 
O’Connor, the symbol of the almost mythical foreign investor in the current rhetoric, found 
himself enmeshed in relationships very similar to those of Indian merchants. He too is 
dependent on the government to ensure relatively smooth operations and is currently looking 
for ways to strengthen his connection to the party. The overall result has significantly 
bolstered the power of the party state, even if there is now more recognised space for local 
elites to jostle for position on the lower levels. I have argued that we should not view neo-
liberal reforms strictly as an epoch-changing event, or a unified set of changes. Instead, much 
like the organ-trafficking scandal, it is something brought about as elites attempt to 
consolidate their status and power.     
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